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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
In October 1984, the EPU, in collaboration with the 
University of Strasbourg and TEPSA, organised a conference to 
examine in detail the Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union. This Working Paper, presented at the conference and 
revised in light of the discussion, will appear in book form later 
in 1985 along with other studies of the Draft Treaty.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 
Unit can be obtained from the Director, at the European University 




















































































































































































For a quarter of a century Europe has lived on the 
political capital invested in the Treaty of Rome. Industry, 
trade and agriculture have been transformed by the common 
market, the commercial and the agricultural policies laid down 
in that treaty. The European Community has held fairly firm 
against the fragmentation of the market that bedevilled 
relations between its member countries in the 1930s; and it 
has become a trading power on the scale of the United States. 
But the institutions and instruments that made this possible 
were inherited from the founding fathers. Far too little 
has been done to build on that inheritance.
"Far too little": those are normative words. The 
norms of economic union to which they relate include a 
completely open internal market, for services and high 
technology products as well as the more ordinary manufactures; 
enough monetary integration to ensure against beggar-thy- 
neighbour devaluations within the Community and to provide a 
means of defence against American interest rates and the 
Japanese exchange rate; a common energy policy that offers a 
stronger defence against the effects of disruption in the 
international petroleum market; a common industrial policy to 
promote a European information technology that can compete 
with the Japanese and the Americans. Without such measures, 
our efforts to recover a dynamic and competitive European 
economy will remain hamstrung. With them, there should be 





























































































The root cause of the Community's failure to develop 
may be identified in the right of veto. "How can the complex 
and diversified unit that the Community has become", as 
President Mitterrand put it in his address to the European 
Parliament on 24 May 1984, "be governed by the rules of the 
Diet of the old kingdom of Poland, where every member could 
block the decisions? We all know where that 1 e d ." ̂  ̂  The 
European Parliament's Draft Treaty proposes to eradicate this 
cause of Europe's impotence through the principle of Union 
legislation enacted by majority votes of both Council and 
Parliament.^) The importance of this proposal can hardly be 
exaggerated. Instead of spending years discussing matters 
critical to our future before reaching either weak decisions 
or none at all, this method of legislating is designed to 
enable the Community to take action on them in good time: to 
convert common action from an unsatisfied need into an effective 
rea1i t y .
The voting system for enacting laws by codecision 
of Council and Parliament is stipulated in articles 17, 23 
and 38 of the Draft Treaty, where obstruction by veto finds 
no place. Unanimity is, it is true, required for amendment 
of the Treaty (art. 84), appointment of the Commission's 
President (art. 24 - it is assumed that the European Council 
will continue to use the unanimity procedure) and integration 
of defence and foreign policy (arts. 66-8). But it is fair 
to suppose that, under the procedures proposed in the Draft 
Treaty, economic policy would not be obstructed by individual 
member governments.
^ )Europe Documents No. 1312, 20 May 1984, Brussels, p.6.
^)j.P. Jacqué identifies these as the heart of the Parliament's 
proposals: "instaurer le vote a la majorité qualifiée du 
Conseil" and "doter le Parlement d'un droit de participer 
à la prise de décision législative et budgétaire". See 
"Bilan et perspective sur le plan institutionnel", in 
R. h'rbek, J. Jamar, W. Wessels (eds), The European Parliament 
on the Eve of the Second Direct Elec tion: Balance Sheet and 
Prospects, Bruges, De Tempel for the College of Europe, 1984, 
p.93. But see also the possibility under the Draft Treaty 
of enacting Union laws with a minority vote in the Council 




























































































The Draft Treaty gives the Union the Community 
patrimony^3 ) together with the right to legislate over a vast 
field of economic and social policy, which includes the 
essential powers implied by the norms indicated above and a lot 
more besides. The Union's right is, properly, to be exclusive 
with respect to the completion of the common market and the 
common commercial policy (arts. 47-8, 64); and it is to share 
with the Member States a concurrent right to legislate on almost 
the whole of economic policy and a large part of social policy.
This paper will go on to show, article by article, why the field 
for Union legislation on economic and social policy may be 
regarded as too extensive. But since the Draft's endeavours 
to deal with this problem are to be found for the most part in 
its general and institutional provisions, it is necessary first 
to consider these in so far as they bear upon the issue.
Concurrent competence: a risk of over-centralisation?
"If the system of the Union is to be uniform, the 
law of the Union must take precedence over national law ...
This is not a question of political supremacy, but simply a 
condition of c o n s i s t e n c y . " ^  If the European Union is to 
establish the essential elements of an economic union its 
laws must clearly have supremacy over Member States' laws 
as far as those elements are concerned. But where concurrent 
competence reaches beyond the essentials, the case for Union 
supremacy is not so clear. For although the term has a fine 
ring about it of share-and-share-alike, concurrent competence 
turns into exclusive competence with respect to any matter 
on which the Union has legislated. As Wheare put it, the 
authority which, "in case of conflict, is to prevail ... will 
possess, in my opinion, potential though not actual exclusive
^ A r t i c l e  7 of the Draft Treaty includes in the Community patrimony 
the EC treaties, conventions, protocols and acts, together with 
"the measures adopted within the context of the European Monetary 
System and the European Political Cooperation".
de Gucht, "Working Document on the Law of the Union",
in Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on 
Institutional Affairs on the substance of the preliminary 
draft Treaty es tablishing the European Union3 Part C:
Preparatory Documents, European Parliament Document 




























































































j u r i s d i c t i o n " ; ^  and Biehi observes that concurrent competence 
has been the most important basis for centralisation in the 
relations between Bund and Lender in the Federal Republic of 
Ge rmany.^  ̂
Thus it appears that the scope of concurrent 
competence in the Draft Treaty would allow the Union to fix 
the rate of any tax anywhere within its territory, to control 
the budgets of national or local authorities, to stop any 
research programme, to drive a road through any part of a 
member country, to determine the school curriculum and to 
run the health service. Although it may be objected that 
the Union would not in practice for a very long time, perhaps 
would never do such things, it is necessary to examine very 
carefully any aspect of its constitution that could be more 
centralising than those of the existing democratic federations 
such as Australia, Canada, the German Federal Republic, 
Switzerland or the US.
One reason why the European Union needs to be less 
centralised than the existing federations, not more, is to 
reflect the cultural and social diversity which is such a 
cherished value for the peoples of Western Europe. To err 
on the side of an over-centralised economic policy would moreover 
be particularly inappropriate when there is so much uncertainty 
as to which policy can deal successfully with the contemporary 
economy. Experiments with a variety of policies are needed; 
and the Union's solidarity could only suffer from attempts to 
enforce on the Member States a policy that failed. Much of the 
diversity of social policy reflects diversities of culture and 
society, which should be respected not suppressed; and social 
policy too can only benefit from variety and experiment.
( ^K. C. Wheare, Federal Government > London, Oxford University 
Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951 
(first edition 1 946 ), p .79.
(^Dieter Biehi, Die Ausges tal tung des Finan zausgl eichssy s terns in 
der Bundesrepublik im einzelnen, unpublished paper, 1983, p.62ff. 
See also for a general discussion of centralisation versus 
decentralisation in the German context, Dieter Biehi,
"Die Entwicklung des Finanzausgleichs in ausgewclhlten Bundes- 
staaten, Bundesrepublik Deutschland", in Fritz Neumark, Norbert 
Andel, Heinz Haller (eds), Handbuoh der Finanzwissensohaft,




























































































More fundamentally, the danger of over-centralisation 
has been sensed by contemporary Europeans and they do not like 
it, at any level of government. The contemporary reaction against 
over-centralisation, reflected in the popularity of the slogan 
"small is beautiful", is not an evanescent fashion but a profound 
response to a great dilemma of modern society; and a Union that 
does not respect this need for decentralisation will not serve 
its people well. They could become politically alienated and 
the foundations of civic order be undermined if the Union were 
to suppress the political vitality of the local or national 
communities within it, as it could if it were to assume responsi­
bility for the bulk of economic and social policy.
The Draft Treaty's attempts to limit centralisation
The principal architect of the Draft Treaty, Altiero 
Spinelli, was aware of the danger of over-centralisation. The 
chief defence which he and his colleagues in the European 
Parliament's Committee on Institutional Affairs devised against 
it was the principle of subsidiarity, which according to Spinelli 
would make "Union action ... subsidiary to that of the Member 
States, and not vice versa".
The Draft Treaty provides that "The Union shall only 
act to carry out those tasks which may be undertaken more 
effectively in common than by the Member States acting separately, 
in particular those whose execution requires action by the Union 
because their dimension or effects extend beyond national 
frontiers" (art. 1 2 ) . ^  Yet the question whether "effects 
extend beyond national frontiers" is a matter of degree; and 
American experience shows that it can be interpreted very widely 
indeed. The US Constitution empowers Congress "to regulate 
commerce ... among the several States". Not only have the words 
"regulate" and "commerce" been "so liberally construed by the 
Supreme Court that the federal government now has almost complete
(7 >A. Spinelli, "Note on some problems of terminology", in
Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs, Part C, 
op. cit., p . 160.
(®^The Preamble expresses the intention slightly differently:
"to entrust common institutions, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, only with those powers to complete 
successfully the tasks they may carry out more satisfactorily 




























































































control of the industrial and commercial life of the country".
There has been further pressure to interpret "the phrase ... 'inter­
state commerce' ... so generously that 'intra-state' disappears 
altogether". As Justices of the Supreme Court said in 1935
"There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction 
between what is national and what is local in matters of commerce. 
Motion at the outer rim is communicated perceptibly, though 
minutely, to recording instruments at the c e n t r e . T h e  Supreme 
Court then drew a distinction between "direct and indirect 
effects". But by 1942 the Court was concerned not with whether 
effects were direct or indirect but whether they were substantial: 
"Even if an activity be local and though it may not be regarded 
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by 
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on inter-state 
commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what at 
some earlier time might have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect'. 
Although these cases date from four or five decades ago, they have 
been cited because they relate to a period when economic centrali­
sation became a big issue in the US, and hence throw some light 
on the possibility of this happening in Europe. They indicate 
that to confine Union legislation to tasks whose "effects extend 
beyond national frontiers" may not provide a very significant 
limit to Union competence without a fairly generous concept of 
how substantial the effects would have to be.
Whether a task can be "undertaken more effectively 
in common" depends, moreover, on the nature of the task. The 
Draft Treaty stipulates that the Union shall effect the approxi­
mation of the laws relating to taxation "in so far as necessary
( ^ A .  L. Goodhart, "The Constitution of the United States", in 
Patrick Ransome (ed.), Studies in Federal Planning, London, 
Macmillan, 1943, p.256.
^°^Wheare, op . c i t . , p . 14 3.
^ ^ J u s t i c e s  Cardozo and Stone, in the case Schechter Poultry 
Corporation v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 495, p.554, 
cited in Wheare, 1o c . c i t .
("'^Supreme Court in the case Wickard v. Filburn ( 1 942 ) 31 7 U.S.Ill, 
p.125; U.S. v. Darby (1941) 312 U.S. 100, p . 119; cited in 
Wheare, 1o c . c i t .



























































































for economic integration" (art. 49). If economic integration 
is defined, as it could be, to include fiscal uniformity, this 
does not leave diversity much of a chance. Wherever, indeed, 
the Union decides to adopt uniformity in a particular field as 
an objective, the principle of subsidiarity is no help, because 
such a task can hardly be undertaken except in common.
The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany
provides that the central government shall have legislative
rights in the field of concurrent legislation "in so far as
a necessity for regulation by federal law exists because ...
the preservation of legal or economic unity demands it, in
particular the preservation of uniformity of living conditions
extending beyond the territory of an individual L a n d " . ^ ^
This provision has been interpreted, according to Biehl, as
placing on the Bund an obligation to promote the unification
of living standards in the federation, with highly centralising
consequences for economic policy, squeezing the autonomy of both
Lender and local authorities. The European Union Draft
Treaty, one of whose objectives is "the progressive elimination
of the existing imbalances between its regions" (art. 9), may
(15 1contain the potential for a similar outcome.v '
The Preamble to the Draft Treaty does qualify its 
determination "to increase solidarity between the peoples of 
Europe" by acknowledging the need to respect "their historical 
identity, their dignity and their freedom". But this seems to 
offer scant protection against the ample potential that the 
Draft offers for objectives that would tend to uniformity.
When to this is added the tendency of policy-makers in insti­
tutions that govern large areas to give weight to economies
(131x 'English translation from Arthur W. Macmahon, in his
Federalism Mature and Emergent, New York, Russell & Russell, 
1962, (first edition Doubleday, 1955), p . 1 6 .
(14).x 'Biehl, Die Ausges tal tung des Finan zausgl eichs sy s terns ,
op. C i t . , p.63ff, and Die Entwicklung des Finanzausgleichs, 
o p . cit. , pp.78, 85ff, 97ff.
^  ̂  S e e also art. 45.2: "The structural and conjunctural policies 
of the Union shall ... promote ... the progressive elimination 
of the existing imbalances between its various areas and 
regions", and art. 58: "The regional policy of the Union shall 




























































































of scale rather than to the value of diversity in government 
of small areas , ̂  ̂  the suspicion that the principle of 
subsidiarity may not be a strong enough guarantee against 
over-centralisation can only be reinforced.
In addition to the principle of subsidiarity, the 
Draft Treaty contains two devices intended as checks to over­
centralisation. One of these is that laws shall "as far as 
possible ... restrict themselves to determining the fundamental 
principles governing common action and entrust the responsible 
authorities in the Union or the Member States with setting out 
in detail the procedures for their implementation" (art. 34).
It may be doubted, however, whether fundamental principles 
can be made effective without specifying their implications in 
a good deal of detail; and the Community's experience appears 
indeed to show that a directive, which is supposed to bind 
member states "as to the result to be achieved", but to "leave 
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods", 
is frequently more detailed than a regulation, which is to be 
"binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States" (Treaty establishing the EEC, art. 189).
The second device lies in the system of voting on 
Union legislation in Parliament and Council. Bigger majorities 
are required to enact organic laws than other laws; and "a law 
which initiates or extends common action in a field where action 
has not been taken hitherto by the Union or by the Communities 
must be adopted in accordance with the procedure for organic laws" 
(art. 12). The meaning of "extends common action in a field where 
action has not been taken hitherto" is not absolutely clear (how 
can action be extended if it has not been taken hitherto?). The 
intention is surely to require the procedure for organic laws 
wherever a law would reduce the field of competence of Member States 
and it might be better to express this provision in that way.
The important issue is, however, the procedure for voting on 
organic laws, as provided in articles 17, 23 and 38.
( )  See, for example, loan Bowen Rees, Government by Community, 




























































































Organic laws may be passed by qualified majorities 
in the Parliament (a majority of members and two-thirds of votes 
cast) and in the Council (two-thirds of the weighted votes cast 
and a majority of the representations). If the qualified majority 
is obtained in the Parliament but not in the Council, however, or 
if the Council has amended the draft law by an absolute majority 
(a majority of the weighted votes cast, comprising at least half 
the representations), the draft is considered by a Council- 
Parliament Conciliation Committee. Failing agreement there, the 
"text forwarded by the Council" goes back to the Parliament, which 
can again approve the draft by a qualified majority. The final 
vote must then be taken within three months in the Council, which 
may reject the draft by a qualified majority: thus the law is 
enacted provided that one-third plus one of the weighted votes 
of the member governments are in favour.
The "text forwarded by the Council" may, of course, 
have been amended by an absolute majority in the Council; and 
if this is the text on which the Parliament votes, at least an 
absolute majority in the Council will have favoured the law, 
rather than just the one-third plus one required for the final 
vote. But Parliament may amend the "text forwarded by the 
Council" provided that the amendments are tabled by the Commission. 
The Parliament can therefore, if it has the Commission's support, 
overrule a weighted vote of anything up to two-thirds of the 
representations of the Member States. While a qualified majority 
in the Parliament is certainly harder to secure than a simple 
majority, there must still be concern that two-thirds of the votes 
cast by MEPs could favour steps towards excessive centralisation, 
perhaps because they were subject to a wave of ideological fervour, 
political passion, or annoyance with a particular member country 
or minority of countries, perhaps because they failed to appreciate 
the cumulative effect of a series of measures each of which 
appeared reasonable enough in itself. It is precisely in antici­
pation of such errors of judgement by majorities of politicians 
that federal constitutions contain legal as well as political 



























































































merit on Member States' fields of jurisdiction; and the reason 
why the Committee on Institutional Affairs did not use the word 
federal in relation to the Draft Treaty cannot be that they 
envisaged a Union which would offer less safeguards for the 
Member States than would a federal system.
The enacting of laws against the opposition of up to 
two-thirds (or even up to half) of the weighted votes of the 
representations of the Member States can indeed hardly be what 
Spinelli had in mind when he wrote that "the concept of com­
petences in the draft ... demands strong proof of consensus 
both within Parliament and in the Council any time a forward 
leap is e n v i s a g e d " . ^)  Nor can it really be said that Union 
action is subsidiary to that of the Member States. The Draft 
Treaty seems to reflect, indeed, a continuing preoccupation 
with the problem of a Community that is too weak in relation 
to the States, whereas once a Union is established with wide 
competences and majority voting, the problem can become the 
converse of strong Union and weak States. But any such pre­
occupation is by no means the only reason why the Draft Treaty 
does not embody a satisfactory solution to this problem. More 
significantly, the complexity and interdependence of modern 
economy and society have made economic and social policy so 
pervasive and interdependent that a clear division of powers 
between Union and States has become increasingly difficult to 
define. It should cause no surprise if second thoughts
are needed on such an intractable problem.
^ ^ A l t i e r o  Spinelli, Towards the European Union3 Sixth Jean Monnet 
Lecture, Florence, European University Institute, 13 June 1983. 
Corbett accepts that, in the case where a law is passed against 
a weighted majority of up to two-thirds in the Council, "we no 
longer have real codecision", but believes that "it is 
surrounded by sufficient safeguards, and at the end of a long 
enough procedure, to be regarded as exceptional" (Richard 
Corbett, "Reform of the Council: The Bundesrat Model",
The Federalist , July 1984, Pavia, p.60). But the safeguards 
do not seem that strong, nor the procedure that long; and even 
were the case exceptional, a crucial competence might neverthe­
less be removed from Member States.
^ ^ T h i s  point was already made in the mid-1 950s by John Fischer, 
"Prerequisi tes of Balance", in Arthur W. Macmahon (ed.), 
Federalism Mature and Emergent, p.62, where Fischer also cited 
Max Beloff, "The Federal Solution in its Application to Europe, 
Asia and Africa", Political Studies , June 1 953 , regarding the 
centralising tendency in federations that has followed on the 




























































































If it is accepted that there is a case for stronger 
safeguards against over-centralisation, the European Parliament 
may wish to consider what changes in the Draft Treaty could 
help to meet that case, without undermining its central features 
of codecision, majority votes and competence with respect to the 
essential elements of economic union.
One such safeguard could be a stronger voting role 
for the Member States' representatives in the Council, without 
approaching the paralysing right of veto. "Strong proof of 
consensus" within the Council could be provided by the requirement 
of a qualified majority (two-thirds of weighted votes and a 
majority of the representations) if an organic law, or one that 
reduces the competence of Member States, is to be enacted. Even 
an absolute majority (a majority of the weighted votes and at 
least half the representations) would serve better than the one- 
third plus one of weighted votes proposed in the present Draft.
The American cases cited earlier (on p.6) may indicate 
that a more precise definition of the reach of the phrase "inter­
state commerce" could have strengthened the propensity of the 
Supreme Court to interpret it in a way that gave weight to the 
autonomy of the States; and the German Commission on Constitutional 
Reform made suggestions for sharpening the wording of certain of 
the articles of the Basic Law that relate to the relation between 
Bund and Land competences, in ways that would secure greater 
autonomy for the L e n d e r . I t  may be worthwhile for jurists 
at least to consider the potential for making the principle of 
subsidiarity more effective by sharper definition in the Treaty 
and by "spelling out further the role of the Court in defending 
the principle of di versi ty".
^ ^ B i e h l  (Die Ausges tal tung des F-Lnan zausgleichssy s terns, o p . c i t . , 
p .7 6 ) cites from a critique on this point in Eberhard G r a b i t z , 
De zentralisierung des Politischen HandelnSj Forschungsbericht 
des Kommuna1wissenschaft1ichen Instituts der Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, Bonn, 1979.
Roy Pryce, Towards European Union, (Report of a Federal Trust 
Study Group on the European Parliament's draft proposals for 




























































































Something of this purpose has been served by the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the US Constitution, providing 
that no person be deprived "of life, liberty and property without 
due process of law", which have caused the Supreme Court at times 
to invalidate legislation to regulate economic life.^2^  The 
interpretation of the equivalent elements of the Canadian 
Constitution seemed, according to Wheare, to amount to a power 
for the central government to legislate on "trade and commerce, 
except where it conflicts with property and civil rights in a 
province", with the latter phrase being given such a wide inter­
pretation that "the scope of 'trade and commerce1 has been 
greatly narrowed".^* 22 23̂ But there was in both cases "much 
uncertainty about the respective powers of general and state 
governments, because of the conflicting and ambiguous language 
adopted".^22  ̂ In view of the greater diversity among the European 
peoples, it is particularly important that the Union Treaty be as 
clear as possible in this respect.
The Draft Treaty offers everybody within the Union's 
jurisdiction "the fundamental rights and freedoms derived in 
particular from the common principles of the Constitutions of 
the Member States and from the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms"(art. 4.1) 
and requires the Union to undertake "to maintain and develop, 
within the limits of its competences, the economic, social and 
cultural rights derived from the Constitutions of the Member 
States and from the European Social Charter". The EEC Treaty 
provides that it "shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member 
States governing the system of property ownership" (art. 222); 
and article 7 of the Draft Treaty makes the "objectives and scope" 
of the Treaties establishing the EC into "a part of the law of 
the Union" which can "only be amended in accordance with the 
procedure for revision" of the Treaty, i.e. by unanimous agree­
ment (art. 84). If "the rules in Member States governing the 
system of property ownership" are not to be counted among the 
"objectives and scope" of the Rome Treaty, however, this provision
(2^Wheare, op. ci t . , p . 14 5.
(22) Ibid., p.137.




























































































could be amended by the procedure for organic laws (art. 38).
Further consideration should perhaps be given to the possibility 
of strengthening any of these potential bulwarks against too 
much centralisation.
Amended voting procedures, sharper wording of general 
principles and guarantees of human rights may, however, not by 
themselves offer sufficient guard against over-centralisation.
We will therefore consider, in analysing article by article the 
Draft Treaty's sections on economic and social policy, how far 
the Union's powers could usefully be limited by closer definition 
of particular aims or fields among its competences, of the instru­
ments it may use in relation to them, or of the conditions under 
which they may apply. We will at the same time try to identify 
those aims, fields and instruments that must be allocated to the 
Union if it is to create an economic union which can satisfy the 
essential needs of its citizens.
The common market and common commercial policy
The aims and instruments for achieving a common 
internal market and an external trade policy were already given 
to the Community in the Treaty of Rome. Without them, there 
can be no economic union. The common market remains far from 
complete because the Community's institutions, blocked by the 
right of veto, have not been strong enough to ensure that the 
aims of the Treaty are realised. The Draft Treaty for European 
Union would rectify that institutional weakness; and there can 
be no faulting the Draft for maintaining external trade and trade 
among the Member States as fields of exclusive Union competence.
The questions that should be raised about these articles (47-9 
and 64) relate, rather, to a certain excess of detail and a 
potential for excessive harmonisation.
External trade policy. Excess of detail can hardly be attributed 
to the Draft's provision for external trade policy: "in the field 
of commercial policy, the Union shall have exclusive competence" 





























































































Nor does the definition of the field seem likely to present 
undue difficulty. The Treaty of Rome uses the words "common 
policy in the matter of external trade" (art. 111.1) and that 
presumably includes invisible as well as visible trade. It is 
not so clear that the Draft Treaty provides for a common policy 
on all other aspects of external economic relations, which have 
grown increasingly important with the growth of international 
economic interdependence. Development aid is covered (art. 64.3); 
and the provision for monetary union (art. 52) centralises part 
of currency reserves and in other ways implicitly concerns 
external monetary relations. But it is not so clear that the 
Union would have power to make policy on inward or outward 
i nvestment.
Trade among the States. The Draft's treatment of internal trade 
is not so straightforward. Article 47.1 includes the words 
"The Union ... shall have exclusive competence for trade between 
Member States", which would, with the addition after "competence" 
of the words "in the field of policy" (to avoid any implication 
that a state-trading system might be intended) be precisely 
analogous to the provision for external trade policy: simple 
definition of a field of exclusive competence. But the Draft 
also adds the objective "to complete, safeguard and develop the 
free movement of persons, services, goods and capital within 
its territory" and stipulates instruments in the form of "detailed 
and binding programmes and timetables", specifying the number of 
years within which free movement is to be achieved. Yet it is 
not obvious that the institutions of the Union should be told 
by the Treaty precisely what they must aim to do in their field 
of exclusive competence or how they are to do it. There can be 
no doubting that free movement of people, services, goods and 
money among the Member States must be one of the bases of the 
Union; and perhaps "complete, safeguard and develop" adds something 
to the objectives already defined in the EC T r e a t i e s ^ ^  without
^ ^ " T h e  Community shall be based upon a customs union which 
shall cover all trade in goods" (Rome Treaty art. 9.1); 
"restrictions on freedom to supply services within the 



























































































adding too much. But the detailed specification of means for 
attaining the objectives may be based on an inappropriate analogy 
with the Rome Treaty, when detailed Treaty obligations had to be 
employed to secure action by the Member States since the Community 
institutions lacked the strength to ensure that even such a 
central objective would be fulfilled by the development of 
Community policy after the Treaty had been ratified. With the 
institutions designed by the Draft Treaty, however, the boot is 
on the other foot. The Union institutions have the strength to 
make their own policy in any field of Union competence, without 
being told how to do it by a Treaty ratified by the States.
When we see how far such a bare definition of competence 
as "to regulate commerce ... among the several States" has taken 
the US federal government into regulation of the economic affairs 
of the States, we may have cause to ask whether "complete, safe­
guard and develop" might not give too much weight to the case 
for harmonisation where this conflicts with cultural diversity. ,
This again raises the question whether the Draft Treaty could 
better embody the value of diversity in its objectives and in 
some other of its provisions.
The Draft Treaty might, then, be improved by reducing 
the provision on internal trade to the plain definition of the 
field: "The Union shall have exclusive competence in the field 
of policy for trade between Member States". But this does not 
come high on the list of potential improvements; the Union could 
live with the text as it stands. Article 47 also gives the Union 
exclusive competence "to complete, safeguard and develop the 
free movement of persons ... and capital". Beyond the free move­
ment of workers, which the Treaty of Rome lays d o w n , ^ ^  the free 
movement of persons is not a matter of economic policy so will 
not be considered here. The Draft Treaty requires the free move­
ment of capital to be completed "within a period of ten years 
following the entry into force of this Treaty"; and this has to 
be seen in conjunction with the Draft's provisions for monetary 
union, of which the movement of capital is one aspect (see p .29 below). 
(2 5)
v '"The free movement for workers shall be secured within the





























































































C ompet i ti on policy. The Draft Treaty gives the Union exclusive 
competence "to complete and develop competition policy at the 
level of the Union" (art. 48). The Rome Treaty defined the aims 
of competition policy as being to prevent abuse of "a dominant 
position within the common market" (art. 86) and to prohibit 
agreements "which may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within the common market", five main 
types of such agreement being specified (art. 85). This definition 
has stood the test of a quarter of a century fairly well. The 
main objection has been that the Rome Treaty omits any safeguard 
against the creation of dominant positions as distinct from their 
abuse; and the Draft Treaty is surely right to generalise to the 
economy as a whole the system for authorising mergers that is 
provided with respect to the coal and steel sectors in the ECSC 
Treaty (art. 66). The wisdom of the words "complete and develop 
competition policy at the level of the Union" is not so clear, 
if this gives the Union a free hand to range beyond the definitions 
of competition policy in the Treaties establishing the EEC and the 
ECSC. Might not the term "competition policy" be stretched far 
beyond those limits? Does "policy at the level of the Union" 
mean that the Union's competence still reaches only to agreements 
"likely to affect trade between the Member States", or is it less 
meaningful? If the answers to those questions imply scope for 
expansion of Union competence far beyond the concepts of the 
existing Treaties, it might be wiser to stick closer to those 
Treaties' wording that has stood the test of time fairly well.
Article 48 of the Draft Treaty contains two further 
points, which may respond to criticisms of the articles on 
competition policy in the Treaty of Rome. One concerns "the 
need to prohibit any form of discrimination between public and 
private undertakings"; here it might be argued that provisions 
inherited by the Union from the Rome Treaty offer adequate safe­
guard against t h i s . T h e  other point enjoins the Union to 
bear in mind "the need to restructure and strengthen the industry
^ ^ " ... any aid granted by a Member State or through State
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens 
to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common 



























































































of the Union in the light of the profound disturbances which may 
be caused by international competition".
It has for some time been argued that the Commission 
could, under the existing Treaties, authorise joint programmes 
of capacity reduction by hard-pressed sectors and, after insisting 
on the point that such programmes must show a benefit to the 
consumer, the Commission has begun to adapt its policy in this 
direction. Article 85 does indeed allow the Commission to permit 
any agreement "which contributes to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings 
concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attain­
ment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possi­
bility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products in question". If words such as "fair share", 
"not indispensable" and "eliminating competition" are thought to 
load the dice too heavily against agreements that help to improve 
production or promote technical or economic progress, there may 
be a case for rectifying that more precisely in article 48 of 
the Draft Treaty, rather than introducing concepts such as 
"restructuring" and "profound disturbances which may be caused by 
international competition", which present difficulties of inter­
pretation and rest uneasily in what amounts to the constitution 
of a union of states.
Approximation of laws and taxation. The Draft Treaty follows 
the Treaty of Rome in seeking to iron out those aspects of 
Member States' laws and taxes that distort economic transactions 
within the common market. The Rome Treaty provided for "the 
approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States as directly affect 
the establishment or functioning of the common market" (art. 100). 
The Draft Treaty, referring to "the laws, regulations and adminis­
trative provisions relating to undertakings, and in particular to 




























































































them in so far as they "have a direct effect on a common action 
of the Union" (art. 49). The US may have left too much autonomy 
with the individual States in matters of company law. But local 
variations in "provisions laid down by law, regulation or adminis­
trative action" may have their justification in the social and 
cultural diversity among European countries; and it seems desirable 
to preserve such variation where it does not substantially and 
"directly affect the establishment or functioning" of the common 
market or the economic union. Might not the Draft Treaty's 
formulation which requires approximation where there is "a direct 
effect on a common action of the Union" make it too easy for the 
Union to initiate common action that implies excessive uniformity, 
and then to steam-roller any of the Member States' policies or 
practices that stand in the way? If so, it might be better to 
return to the Rome Treaty's "directly affect the establishment or 
functioning of the common market", and perhaps add "and substan­
tially" after "directly".
Article 49 of the Draft Treaty goes on to require 
that "a law shall lay down a Statute for European undertakings", 
which fills a need about which the Rome Treaty was not sufficiently 
explicit, even if the Commission found a justification for proposing 
a European Company Statute under article 101, which requires 
distortions due to differences between Member States' laws to be 
eliminated. Article 49 then moves on to "the approximation of 
the laws relating to taxation", which a Union law is to effect 
"in so far as necessary for economic integration within the Union". 
Economic integration could, as suggested earlier, be defined in 
such a way as to require complete fiscal uniformity throughout 
the Union. That this is not a fanciful suggestion is shown by 
one of the most-quoted books on the subject, which asserts that 
"total economic integration presupposes the unification of 
monetary, fiscal, social and countercyclical p o l i c i e s " . y e t  
the structure and rates of tax are at the heart of modern 
politics, and of social policy iri particular. The Union needs 
to get the money for its own expenditure (arts. 71, 75 and 76 of
Be 1 a Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, London,





























































































the Draft Treaty provide for this) and divergences between Member 
States' taxes should be reduced in so far as they substantially 
distort inter-State trade. But beyond .that, the States should 
be left to collect their own taxes at their own rates in their 
own way. The alternative is likely to drain them of political 
vitality, by shifting to the Union the major decisions of social 
poli cy.
Two changes in article 49 might help to guard against 
this.- One would be, drawing in part on the wording in article 101 
of the Rome Treaty, to replace "in so far as is necessary for 
economic integration" by "in so far as Member States' taxes 
substantially distort the conditions of competition in the Union" 
(or perhaps "substantially distort economic transactions among 
the Member States"). In addition, it might be appropriate to 
exclude personal income tax from the Union's jurisdiction. For 
whereas a certain measure of harmonisation of company tax and 
indirect tax may be needed to make the economic union work 
efficiently, the case for interference in the States' income 
taxes is weaker; and this would preserve for them a chasse gardée 
where they can vary their total revenue and influence the distri­
bution of incomes.
General economic policy
The Member States have reached a stage of inter­
dependence where they need a common economic policy, to help 
maintain equilibrium between their economies, provide a framework 
for their economic development, safeguard their interests in and 
contribute to the management of the wider international economy. 
The drafters of the Rome Treaty did not venture to seek a transfer 
of powers to this end from the States' central banks and finance 
ministries. The Draft Treaty is more courageous.
Article 50 gives the Union "concurrent competence in 
respect of conjunctural policy, with a particular view to 




























































































Union". The word "conjunctural" has an association with the 
management of shorter-term trends in the economy, which may be 
unfortunate at a time when policies designed to be effective 
over a longer period tend to be viewed as more important. Perhaps 
the more operative term is, in any case, the "economic policies" 
that are to be coordinated. But whether we speak of conjunctural 
or general economic policies, we have entered a field which is 
harder to define than trade policy, competition policy or the 
approximation of tax and company law; so it is harder to envisage 
the limits of Union action in coordinating the economic policies 
of the States.
One point is quite clear. "Laws shall lay down the 
conditions under which the Commission, in conjunction with the 
Member States, shall utilise the budgetary or financial mechanisms 
of the Union for conjunctural ends" (art. 50.4). The Union is to 
use its money ("our money", if we are the Union's citizens) with 
regard for the aims of its conjunctural (better perhaps "economic") 
policy. The limits to this action depend on the amount of money 
to be raised and spent by the Union; and the Draft Treaty sets no 
limit to this. Member States intending to establish the Union 
could well raise the question of a limit to the Union's tax-raising 
powers since, as the experience of the Federal Republic of Germany 
shows, the division of revenue between them is fundamental to the 
balance of power between Union and States. The Union would be too 
weak in relation to the States, and unable to make its proper 
contribution to efficiency and welfare, if it were shackled by 
limits of the order of magnitude that now prevails; but it might 
be reasonable to consider, in the light for example of the 
MacDougall report,^ 8 )  a limit of say 5 per cent of the Union's 
GDP, which could be raised only by Treaty amendment. )
(^8}The Role of Public Finance in the European Communities,
2 vols, Brussels, Commission of the EC, April 1977.
( ^ W h e r e  would be less risk of a Treaty-entrenched limit stunting 
the development of the Union sometime in the future if Treaty 
amendment were to require a large majority, rather than 





























































































The limits to Union power under paragraphs 2 and 3 
of article 50 are not so easy to define. Paragraph 2 requires 
the Commission to "define the guidelines and objectives to which 
the action of the Member States shall be subject on the basis of 
the principles and within the limits laid down by laws"; and 
paragraph 3 stipulates that laws "shall lay down the conditions 
under which the Commission shall ensure that the measures taken 
by the Member States conform with the objectives it has defined".^®* 
Thus the Union is to establish the aims of Member States' economic 
policies and control the means, i.e. the policy instruments, by 
which the aims are to be achieved.
The outcome of a Member State's economic policy is a 
matter of common interest, because inflation or deflation is 
transmitted to other Member States through the economic transactions 
between them. It is therefore right that the Union should seek to 
influence the Member States' policies towards a mutually satis­
factory outcome. But a requirement that the Union control "the 
measures taken by the Member States", which could well become 
control over all their economic policy instruments - however these 
might be defined - is another matter.
One reason for doubting its wisdom is that the relation­
ship between measures and outcomes is a matter of judgement, not 
of objective fact; and such judgements have become hazardous in 
these turbulent times. They offer a shaky basis for a massive 
incursion into the polities of the States.
A second reason for doubt is uncertainty as to the 
instruments which the Union might feel justified in requiring
the Member States to use under its supervision. Incomes policy
%
is a contentious issue, hotly contested by liberal economists, 
by politicians who believe in them and by many traditionalist 
trade unionists. Yet it is quite conceivable that incomes policy,
^ ^ P a r a g r a p h  3 goes on to make "the" monetary, budgetary or financial 
aid of the Union conditional on compliance with the measures 
taken under paragraph 2 above". It is normal that balance-of- 
payments support should be conditional on governments' compliance 
with policy guidelines; but it is another question whether a 
Union policy for supplying cheap butter to old age pensioners 
should be withdrawn from those who inhabit a certain Member State, 
just because of reca1 ci trance by a government they might well have 
voted against, over an issue which can be quite a subjective one - 




























































































which not long ago enjoyed widespread support, could again win 
enough support to be enacted as Union law on the basis of two-thirds 
of the votes cast by the Members of the European Parliament (which 
need be no more than a bare majority of all MEPs), together with 
acceptance by the Commission and by the representatives of France, 
Greece and Italy in the Council (or Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain after enlargement), to name only currently socialist-led 
governments which could account for more than one-third of the 
Council's weighted votes. The Members of the last European Parliament 
must have thought such a Union law feasible, or they would not have 
voted in favour of article 56, which provides that "the Union may 
take action in the field of social and health policy, in particular 
in matters relating to ... collective negotiations between employers 
and employees, in particular with a view to the conclusion of Union­
wide collective agreement". Now it happens that the present writer 
shares the view that imperfections are inherent in modern labour 
markets to the extent that, if inflation is to be controlled, the 
only alternative to high unemployment is incomes policy - even if 
the incomes policy takes the non-statutory form of nation-wide or 
industry-wide (as in West Germany) collective agreements between 
trade unions and employers' associations. But to impose this view, 
which may after all be mistaken, on a country where the government 
is bitterly opposed to incomes policy or the trade unions are 
going to kick it overboard would be to court a failure of that 
policy and to strain solidarity within the Union up to or beyond 
the breaking point. The same could be said of an attempt to 
counter a recession or restrain a boom by investment planning 
(c.f. article 51, with its "objective of coordinating the use of 
capital market resources by the creation of a European capital 
market committee").
Alternatively, a right-wing qualified majority of MEPs, 
supported by a right-wing Commission and the governments of 
Britain, Denmark and Germany (or Britain, Denmark, Germany and 
the Netherlands after enlargement), could prohibit incomes policy 




























































































those instruments. Or they might decide that budgetary laxity 
was generating inflation in some Member States and that national 
budgets therefore had to be controlled. This is quite plausible, 
since budgetary control was wanted by the officials and central 
bankers on the Werner Committee, whose widely-acclaimed report 
proposed that "quantitative guidelines will be given on the 
principal elements of the public budgets, notably on global 
receipts and expenditure, the distribution of the latter between 
investment and consumption, and the direction and amount of the 
b a l a n c e " . N o r  are bankers, officials and politicians lacking 
today who are convinced that budgetary control is the key to a 
healthy economy. Yet central control of the States' budget 
balances, let alone of the size of their receipts, expenditure, 
consumption and investment, is a concept that is alien to federal 
systems; and even in the highly centralised United Kingdom, the 
present government has encountered great difficulty in imposing 
such constraints on the local authorities.
Union control over States' budgets would, then, be 
an infringement of their autonomy that the search for a unified 
economic policy could hardly justify. Not only is the economic 
outcome of such measures quite speculative, but consistency of 
the several States' economic trends, although desirable, is not 
an absolute necessity, with the interdependence among them, although 
very significant, remaining far short of the interdependence among 
the regions of most Member States.
With the exception of money, indeed, the idea of Union 
control of the States' instruments of general economic policy 
seems to be of dubious validity. The non-monetary instruments, 
such as incomes policy, budgets and quantitative planning, are 
highly sensitive in terms of both party-political orientation and 
the autonomy and vitality of the States' polities. To harness 
Member States' instruments of this kind to a concept as wide and 
general as that of the Union's economic or conjunctural policy
^ ^ ^ R e p o r t  to the Council and the Commission on the realisation 
by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community 
(the Werner Report), Supplement to Bulletin 11-1970 of the 




























































































would launch the Union into uncharted and quite likely dangerous 
waters. The risk of dangerous waters must sometimes be taken.
But here it does not seem justified, because control over monetary 
policy, for which the interdependence of the national monetary 
systems is anyway a convincing motive, would give the Union instru­
ments as powerful as it probably needs at its present stage of 
economic interdependence. A simple solution would, then, be to 
define the Union's concurrent competence for economic policy in 
terms not of this potentially enormous field, but of more specific 
fields and instruments: "budgetary or financial mechanisms of the 
Union" (art. 50.4) and the field of monetary policy - or, if more 
precision. were desired, specified instruments of monetary policy. 
This might imply either amending the Draft Treaty in order to 
subject article 50 paragraphs 1-3 to the method of cooperation 
rather than concurrent competence, or deleting those three para­
graphs altogether. Some unnecessary undergrowth would thus be 
cut from the Draft, while giving the Union, in the field of 
monetary policy, the crucial strength that the Community now lacks.
Monetary union
Article 52 deals with monetary union. Before that,
however, comes article 51, which gives the Union "concurrent
(32 )
competence as regards European' ' monetary and credit policies, 
with the particular objective of coordinating the use of capital 
market resources by the creation of a European capital market 
committee and the establishment of a European bank supervisory 
authority". The Union is given concurrent competence with respect 
to monetary union in article 52; and if there is enough difference 
between monetary and credit policies to justify specifying the 
credit policies too, this could perhaps be done in the latter 
article. The purpose of article 51 seems, however, to be speci­
fically to introduce the European capital market committee to 
* coordinate the use of capital market resources and the European
bank supervisory authority.
^ ^ H o w  can there be concurrent competence as regards "European
monetary and credit policies", when the States can hardly have 
competence for European policies? Should it not be concurrent 
competence for monetary and credit policies in so far as these 




























































































With free movement of money and of financial services, 
a common regulatory framework for banks and capital markets is 
a logical measure. But the "particular objective of coordinating 
the use of capital market resources" seems to imply a planning of 
investment that is not practised in the majority of Member States 
and is hard to reconcile with the neoliberal philosophy that 
underlies article 33.4, which affirms that "the European Monetary 
Fund shall have the autonomy required to guarantee monetary 
stability". Neither the neoliberal doctrine of article 33.4 nor 
the dirigiste implications of article 51 as it stands seem likely 
to appeal to a majority of Member States; nor do they embody 
principles that are essential for the establishment of the Union, 
even if it might later come to adopt them. Article 33.4 was not 
in the Institutional Committee's earlier draft^33  ̂ and the present 
text could afford to do without it unless the Member States want 
to retain it. Article 51 could be confined to the establishment 
of the regulatory framework for the banks and capital markets.
Article 52 requires that all Member States are to
participate in the European Monetary System (52.1) and gives the
Union "concurrent competence for the progressive achievement of
full monetary union" (52.2). Monetary policy will, as has already
been suggested, remain a crucial field for Union policy after
monetary union (however defined) has been achieved, as well as
in the achieving of it. There should be no doubt about this,
and it would be better to establish it in the article on the
monetary system and monetary union, not just as an adjunct to
credit policy as in article 51 of the present Draft. Article 52.2
could define the field of competence in such words as "the Union
shall have concurrent competence in the field of monetary policy".
The objective of full monetary union would be stated in a separate 
( 341
sentenced '
(3 3 ^Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairst Part A :
Motion for a Resolution, European Parliament Document 1 -575/83/A, 
15 July 1983.
(■^Another drafting question: can the States really exercise 
competence for the "achievement of full monetary union"?
If not, the definition of the field of concurrent competence 





























































































The significance of this objective depends on how 
"full monetary union" is defined. In his preparatory document, 
the rapporteur on economic union wrote that "the final objective, 
which it will be possible to achieve following a series of auto­
matic, irreversible stages, will be that of advanced unity which 
may go so far as the creation of a genuine common currency which 
is exclusive or parallel to the national currencies". Whether
the common currency is exclusive or parallel is a critical distinc­
tion, for an exclusive common currency puts an end to any monetary 
or currency policy conducted by the Member States. Changes in the 
exchange rate are no longer available to help correct disequi1ibria 
between Member States' economies, so that the whole burden of 
adjustment is likely to be thrown on to deflation or inflation; 
and if pronounced cultural or institutional differences underlie 
the disequi1ibria, the dose of deflation or inflation required to 
overcome them might be severe enough to endanger the Union's 
political stability. A parallel currency, on the other hand, 
gives the Union a common instrument of policy and medium for 
transactions, while leaving room for Member States to secure 
changes in their exchange rates and to conduct monetary policies 
alongside that of the Union.
Despite the risks involved in moving to an exclusive 
common currency, the benefits of reaching that stage would be 
great. The European currency would be an enormous convenience 
to business and to citizens. It would enhance the security of 
the Union's internal market against the danger of fragmentation.
It would give the Union a powerful instrument to counter external 
monetary threats such as high American interest rates or a low 
Japanese exchange rate, and to participate in constructing a 
sound international monetary system. It would set the seal on 
the economic union and affirm, not just in words but in a most 
impressive deed, the commitment to political union among the Member 
States. It is therefore desirable that the definition of a full 
monetary union includes the creation of a common currency and the 
ending of exchange rate changes and of controls on movements of 
money among the Member States.
Moreau, "The Economic Union", in Report of the Committee 




























































































Article 52 of the Draft Treaty requires all Member 
States to participate in the European Monetary System (subject 
to article 35, which allows for delays to be authorised if Union 
laws would cause "specific difficulties" for particular States) 
and provides for an organic l a w ^ ^  to "lay down rules governing... 
the procedures and the stages for attaining monetary union". The 
rules are to govern in particular "the Statute and the operation 
of the European Monetary Fund", "the conditions for the effective 
transfer to the EMF of part of the reserves of the Member States", 
"the conditions for the progressive conversion of the ECU into a 
reserve currency and a means of payment, and its wider use", and 
"the duties and obligations of the central banks in the determin­
ation of their objectives regarding money supply". The transfer 
of part of the States' reserves to the EMF and the wider use of 
the ECU, including as a reserve currency and a means of payment, 
would give the Union the means to develop its monetary system, 
based not only on the exchange rate mechanism and lending arrange­
ments of the EMS but also on the promotion of the ECU as a 
parallel currency and on the EMF as a federal reserve bank. This 
system could, as it developed, increasingly secure the benefits 
associated with an exclusive European currency. The use of the 
parallel currency could, indeed, evolve to the point where changes 
of the States' exchange rates, even though formally permissible, 
were no longer practicable, and later to replace the national 
currencies altogether.
This could be the best route to full monetary union.
But whatever the likely proportions of organic evolution and of 
formally enacted steps, one major barrier will probably have to 
be confronted: the prospect of progress to full monetary union 
without their explicit consent may well be more than some Member 
States will accept. The problem lies not just with the British 
or the French. The Germans, whose society has in the past been 
torn apart by inflation, remain acutely sensitive to the danger
^ ^ R e q u i r i n g  a qualified majority in the Parliament, together 
either with an absolute majority in the Council, or with the 
support of the Commi ssion and a minimum of one-third plus one 
of the weighted votes in the Council (see p.9 above; a two- 




























































































of catching it from their partners. The Bundesbank was hard to 
convince that even the fairly innocuous Stage One of the EMS was 
not going too far and firmly opposes the transition to Stage Two 
and the establishment of the European Monetary Fund. The ECU 
cannot at present even be used for deposits in Germany, as is 
done in other EC countries, on the grounds that it is linked to 
other Member States' currencies and hence "regarded by the Bundes­
bank as an indexed unit, which cannot be used for deposits in 
Germany under article 3 of the 1 948 Currency Law".^3^  The German 
government and parliament could commit the Federal Republic to 
monetary union, despite any opposition from the Bundesbank, if 
the grounds for doing so appeared politically secure. But the 
fear of inflation is deep-rooted enough among the people to render 
conflict with the Bundesbank on such an issue politically dangerous; 
and such fears would not be allayed by article 52.4, which allows 
the Europeary Council (presumably by a unanimous vote) to suspend 
entry into force of the monetary laws for five years after the 
Treaty becomes effective. Wessels, in a commentary on the Draft 
Treaty, finds it singular that the Draft does not require ratifi­
cation by national parliaments for the establishment of full monetary 
union (or of a West European defence system).^38^
If German support for the European Union Treaty were 
to be conditional on provision for Member States' assent to any 
approach to full monetary union beyond the point of no return, 
the European Parliament would probably wish to adapt the Draft 
in order to accommodate the German government. The example might 
be found useful of the formula for transition from the first to 
the second stage when establishing the EEC, which was "conditional 
upon a finding that the objectives specifically laid down in the 
Treaty for the first stage have in fact been attained in substance"
(Rome Treaty, article 8.3); the objective this time would be 
sufficient compatibility among the Member States' economies to 
justify an expectation of continuing equilibrium among them. The 
Rome Treaty required unanimous agreement for its "finding". Quali­
fied majorities in Council and Parliament would be preferable in
^3^David F. Lomax, The Time is Ripe: The European Monetary System,
the ECU and British Policy, (Report of a Federal Trust Study Group), 
London, November 1 984 , p .23.
(38)wolfgang Wessels, "Der Vertragsentwurf des Europaischen Parlaments 




























































































the Union; but it might be necessary to settle for the unanimity 
procedure. The transition in this case would be to full monetary 
union, whether with an exclusive Union currency or, if "national 
monetary symbols", as the Werner Report put it, were to be retained, 
with "the total and irreversible convertibi1ity of currencies, the 
elimination of margins of fluctuation in exchange rates, the irre­
vocable fixing of parity rates and the complete liberation of 
movements of capital. The condition for moving to full
monetary union could be incorporated in the Draft Treaty with 
"the procedures and the stages for attaining monetary union"
(art. 52.3), and would deal with the timetable for the free move­
ment of capital (art. 47.3) as well as with the permanent locking 
of parities or the replacement of national currencies by a 
European currency.
Microeconomic policies
The need for European industry to have secure access 
to a wide European market does not grow less. The third indus­
trial revolution causes specialisation and scale of output, and 
hence the need for the wide market, continually to increase; so 
measures to remove the remaining barriers within the market and 
to keep it open become increasingly important. The Rome Treaty 
has provided most of the instruments needed for this, with its 
articles on the free movement of goods (articles 9-37) and the 
rules governing competition (articles 85-94, which include the 
control of state aids that may distort competition).
If removing distortions to competition were all that 
is required of microeconomic policy, these instruments of negative 
integration provided by the Rome Treaty as it stands would be 
sufficient, in the hands of the institutions of the European Union 
which, unlike those of the Community, would be strong enough to 
ensure that the instruments are fully used. But the market imper­
fections inherent in the modern economy as well as the social 
pressures generated by the third industrial revolution have caused 
all the European governments to introduce a wide range of industrial 39




























































































policies. If these policies were a temporary aberration, the 
instruments of negative integration could control and eventually 
remove them. But although there is disillusion about support for 
lame ducks and lax treatment of uncompetitive firms, one of the 
European governments shows signs of abandoning policies to promote 
technological development and to facilitate adjustment; and 
except on the implausible assumption that the structure of 
industry will come to approximate the perfect competition model, 
economic theory justifies the governments. The European Union 
will be born into a world where industrial policy is a necessary 
fact. Thus the Union's microeconomic policy cannot be confined 
to the extirpation of Member States' industrial policies.
One consequence of this is that the Union should 
recognise the validity of Member States' or firms' industrial 
policies where these contribute to economic progress rather than 
stand in its way. This is doubtless why the Draft Treaty enjoins 
the Union, in making its competition policy, to "bear in mind ... 
the need to restructure and strengthen the industry of the Union" 
(art. 48). The Community has likewise accepted the Member States' 
subsidies to a number of troubled industries, while trying to 
ensure that the subsidies are linked with measures of adjustment. 
Thus the instruments of negative integration can be used to promote 
positive adjustment: subsidies to troubled sectors or agreements 
among those sectors' firms can be made conditional on measures to 
promote a return to competitiveness.
The Community's financial resources have provided it 
with a carrot to go with its stick. Money from the Social Fund, 
the Regional Fund, the European Investment Bank, the New Community 
Instrument and ECSC funds has been used to support industrial 
adjustment. The ECSC Treaty, in addition to authorising the 
Community to raise loans and to levy a turnover tax of up to 
1 per cent of the value of coal and steel production (or more if 
a two-thirds majority in the Council so decides), gives the 
Community powers to influence investment, and to control production 




























































































Thus the Community can complement its right to control Member 
States' subsidies by the use of its own, rather slender, financial 
resources; and in coal, steel and, of course, agriculture, by 
more direct regulation of the market. But outside these particular 
sectors, the Community has only a slight capacity to do more than 
attempt to control the industrial policies of Member States, 
whereas there must be a strong presumption that interdependence 
has reached the point where the States' policies alone are not 
enough, but common policies using substantial common instruments 
are also required.
The powers to tax and borrow that the Draft Treaty 
gives the Union (art. 71.2) would make a very big difference, 
if the Union uses its financial resources to support its micro- 
economic policy. The Draft Treaty also makes particular provision, 
in article 53 on "sectoral policies", for agriculture and fisheries, 
energy, transport, telecommunications, industry, and research and 
deve1opment.
An introduction to that article specifies its concern 
with "specific sectors of economic activity" and "sectoral 
p o l i c i e s " . W h i l e  these terms are appropriate for agriculture 
and fisheries, energy, transport and telecommunications, the word 
"sectoral" is not so apt with respect to industry and to research 
and development, where at least some of the Union's policies should 
apply over a much wider area than is commonly known as a sector.
The aim of the Union's sectoral policies is defined in 
the first sentence of article 53 as "to meet the particular needs 
for the organisation, development or coordination of specific 
sectors of economic activity", which sounds as if the drafters 
had schemes of sectoral planning rather prominently in mind, even 
if the aim of "development" could encompass almost any legitimate 
aim of policy. As if aware that the first sentence may have a 
dirigiste flavour, the next sentence may be intended to reassure
(^^Again, the Union's concurrent competence is to apply to
policies "at the level of the Union". But can Member States 
have competence for policies at Union level? Would it not 
be better to give the Union concurrent competence for "sectoral 





























































































liberals in that the policies "shall, by the establishment of 
reliable framework conditions, in particular pursue the aim of 
facilitating the decisions which undertakings subject to competition 
must take concerning investment and innovation": the Union is to 
provide a framework for investment and innovation in a market 
economy.
To the non-lawyer, the wording of this introductory 
paragraph may seem unwieldy and give a slightly odd impression.
But it is not necessary to raise objections provided that the 
jurists can assure us that it adds something significant to the 
Draft without giving too much scope for unintended or unpredictable 
consequences. If the jurists are not sufficiently sure of that, 
the Draft could be strengthened by confining this paragraph to 
"the Union shall have concurrent competence in the fields of 
sectoral policy specified in this article, in so far as such 
policies substantially affect inter-State trade".
Industry; research and development
Both paragraph d of article 53, on research and develop­
ment, and paragraph e, on industry, are concerned mainly with the 
instruments of Union policy, and in this both emphasise coordin­
ation and guidance of the policies of Member States. For research 
and development, the Union "may draw up common strategies with a 
yiew to coordinating and guiding national activities and encouraging 
cooperation between the Member States and between research insti­
tutes", while for industry it "may draw up development strategies 
with a view to guiding and coordinating the policies of the Member 
States in those industrial branches which are of particular signifi­
cance to the economic and political security of the Union".
The Draft Treaty cannot be faulted for concentrating 
on instruments rather than aims in these two fields. For the aims 




























































































are outlined in the preamble of the Draft and defined in article 9. 
But the general injunction to the Union to coordinate and guide 
"national activities", in the case of research, and "the policies 
of the Member States", in the case of industrial branches with 
particular significance for economic and political security, does 
not help to determine the limits to centralisation in the Union. 
Apart from the principle of subsidiarity, there is no legal limit, 
it would seem, to the Union taking control of the whole of research 
activities in the Member States, with the power to shut down a 
programme of research on developing a microcomputer or even on 
a cure for influenza, for that matter. Nor, as we have seen,
is the principle of subsidiarity much help since the Draft Treaty 
defines the coordination of national research and development 
activities as an objective of Union policy - which can hardly be 
undertaken more effectively "by the Member States acting separately 
More than in most other activities, freedom and variety are essen­
tial for research. The Union should surely confine itself to the 
promotion of research projects whose scale puts them beyond the 
scope of the several Member States and to cooperation with the 
States in encouraging research and development, rather than 
"coordinating and guiding national activities", which could open 
the way to telling not only the public authorities in the Member 
States, but even eventually the researchers, what they are and 
are not to do. Those functions which are suitable for the Union 
in this field could be performed by use of the Union's financial 
resources, without need for powers of compulsion over the research 
policies of Member States, let alone of independent institutes and
^ ^ I n  particular "the economic development of (the Union's) 
peoples with a free internal market and stable currency, 
equilibrium in external trade and constant economic growth, 
without discrimination between nationals or undertakings of 
the Member States by strengthening the capacity of the States, 
the citizens and their undertakings to act together to adjust 
their organisation and activities to economic changes"; "the 
progressive elimination of the imbalance between its regions"; 
"the improvement of international commercial and monetary 
relations"; "the harmonious and equitable development of all 
the peoples of the world".
(4 2 ^If "national activities" were interpreted as applying to 
Member States' public policies, the field for intervention 
would be limited to that extent; but it would still be very 
wide, particularly in relation to those Member States where 





























































































researchers. The Union's financial power will be such that it 
should be able to offer joint finance on terms that would induce 
Member States to cooperate, or failing that, the Union could 
sponsor its own projects independently, without any resort to 
compulsion. Thus it would be better to omit the provision for 
coordination of national activities and to concentrate on the 
remainder of the paragraph on research and development, concerning 
expenditure of the Union's own money on promoting research, whether 
on its own or jointly with others. Paragraph d would then read 
"in the field of research and development, the Union may provide 
financial support for joint research, may take responsibility for 
some of the risks involved and may undertake research in its own 
establishments". If omission of the sentence regarding coordin­
ation of national activities does not preclude Union control of 
the Member States' research policies and activities, a sentence 
should be added to preclude it specifically. If reference to 
common strategies and coordination is held to be desirable, this 
could be by the method of cooperation, which depends on unanimous 
agreement.
There must be a similar concern about the provision for 
"guiding and coordinating the policies of Member States" in the 
field of industry. The limitation of such control to "those 
industrial branches which are of particular significance to the 
economic and political security of the Union" is doubtless 
intended to confine the scope for directive policies on the part 
of the Union to certain sectors that are especially security- 
sensitive, even if the term "economic and political security" 
might permit of wide interpretation. But however wide the inter­
pretation, the restriction to security-sensitive sectors may offer 
too narrow a scope for Union policy: much of industrial policy 
aims to promote innovation and investment and to facilitate 
adjustment over the whole of "industry" (including services as 
well). Such matters are already the subject of Community policies 
on competition, state aids, external trade and expenditure from 





























































































there should be scope for the Union to play a more positive 
role in promoting innovation, investment and adjustment than 
the Community has been able to do. It seems likely that the 
Community patrimony already offers the legal basis for any 
desired expansion of such expenditure from the resources that 
would be available to the Union. But if there is any doubt about 
this, paragraph e on industry could provide, as paragraph d on 
research and development does, for Union expenditure to promote 
innovation, investment and adjustment, whether alone or jointly 
with Member States.
The Esprit programme is but a small beginning to such 
expenditure, confined at present to research; Euratom's expendi­
ture has also been dwarfed by that of Member States; and the 
large public investment in developing European aircraft has been 
kept separate from the Community. But Union programmes of 
development and investment in such high-technology branches could 
well be promoted on the basis of Union finance. (Article 54.1 
also provides for "industrial cooperation structures", such as, 
presumably, the Airbus programme, to be converted "into a common 
action of the Union" if the European Council so decides.)
Union funds could also help to secure adjustment in 
sectors with problems such as shipbuilding or a number of branches 
of chemicals or engineering. An aim of article 53.e may be to 
ensure that rationalisation programmes for such branches are not 
obstructed by, say, one firm or one Member State. The industrial 
logic of this may be impeccable, if one takes, as the present 
author does, a rather Japanese view of industrial policy. But 
unless "branches which are of particular significance to the 
economic and political security of the Union" can be quite narrowly 
defined, the provision for Union coordination could go far to 
suppress the industrial policies of Member States. If such a 
degree of centralisation is not thought desirable, there could 
be merit in resting the Union's industrial policy on the existing 





























































































common commercial policy), with the crucial expansion of the 
funds available for Union expenditure.' Paragraph e could, then, 
refer to this Community patrimony (as does the paragraph on agri­
culture - see below) and provide for Union expenditure (along the 
lines of paragraph d on research and development); and it is for 
consideration whether the paragraph Could stop short at that.^"^ 
Additional instruments, that could be useful for Union policy in 
industry as well as other fields, would be the "specialised 
European agencies" which article 54 authorises the Union to 
establi sh.
Transport, telecommunications
The main concern of articles 74-84 of the Rome Treaty, 
on transport, is to remove any distortions that affect intra­
state trade. The European Investment Bank offers means for 
investment in "projects of common interest to several Member 
States which are of such a size or nature that they cannot be 
entirely financed by the various means available in the individual . 
Member States" as well as "projects for developing less developed 
regions" and some other projects "called for by the progressive 
establishment of the common market" (Rome Treaty, art. 130); and 
the Regional Fund and New Community Instrument could also be used 
to finance projects that would contribute to a Union transport 
network. But it remains true that "the distinctive feature of 
the common transport policy is the lack of positive guidance given 
by the (Rome) T r e a t y " . A  transport network that makes movements 
of people and goods among the Member States easier is an important 
element in creating a political and economic union, and the Draft
^"^Paragraph e of article 53 also includes two sentences about 
procedures. "The Commission shall be responsible for taking 
the requisite implementing measures. It shall submit to the 
Parliament and the Council of the Union a periodic report on 
industrial policy problems." Such procedures are not specified 
in respect of other matters and it is not clear why the Union 
should not be left to fix its own procedures in this matter too, 
instead of having them enshrined in the Treaty. The Draft would 
be none the worse without these two sentences.
Ni gel S. Despicht, Policies for Transport in the Common Marke t3 





























































































Treaty is right to require the Union to "undertake common actions 
to ... develop the capacity of transport routes so as to create 
a transport network commensurate with European needs" (art.53.b).
It may not be so certain that the Rome Treaty's provisions against 
discrimination and distortions in intra-State transport need to be 
supplemented or replaced by a further requirement for the Union to 
"undertake common actions to put an end to all form of discrimin­
ation, harmonise the basic terms of competition between the various 
modes of transport, eliminate obstacles to trans-frontier traffic" 
(Draft Treaty, art. 53.b). Nor, following our earlier argument 
about subsidiarity (pp.6ff, 18, 19), is the requirement for the 
Union to "pursue a policy designed to contribute to the economic 
integration of the Member States" necessarily appropriate in a 
Treaty designed to keep the Union to what really needs to be done 
in common, since "economic integration" can be so widely defined 
(see p .19). It might be better to replace this reference to 
economic integration by a formulation similar to that suggested 
on p .18 for tax harmonisation, e.g. "in the field of transport, 
the Union shall remove distortions that substantially affect 
economic transactions among the Member States".
The Rome Treaty has no reference to telecommunications, 
which have become increasingly important with the rise of infor­
mation technology. The Draft Treaty remedies this omission with 
paragraph c of article 53, which requires that "in the field of 
telecommunications, the Union shall take common action to establish 
a telecommunications network ...". Since the analogy with the case 
for a Union transport network is quite close, it seems odd that 
this is not followed, like the reference in paragraph b to the 
transport network, by "commensurate with European needs". The 
text continues, instead, to require common standards and harmonised 
tariffs. The common standards are doubtless desirable but it might 
be advisable to confine the requirement to harmonise tariffs by 
"in so far as necessary to facilitate inter-State communications". 




























































































in particular with regard to the high technology sectors, research 
and development activities and public procurement policy". This 
reference to research and development in relation to telecommuni­
cations seems to add nothing to paragraph d on research and develop­
ment. It is questionable whether the "high technology sectors" 
related to telecommunications should be treated differently from 
other high-technology sectors which would come under paragraph e 
on industry; and the same could be said of public procurement. If 
the high technology sectors and public procurement need to be 
mentioned here, they should surely also be mentioned elsewhere; 
if they do not need to be mentioned elsewhere, it is doubtful 
whether they should be accorded a special mention here.
Agriculture, energy
For agriculture and fisheries, the Draft Treaty rests 
solely on the Rome Treaty: "in the fields of agriculture and 
fisheries, the Union shall pursue a policy designed to attain 
the objectives laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community" (Draft Treaty, article 53, 
paragraph a). Article 39 of the Rome Treaty lists five objectives: 
"to increase agricultural productivity"; "thus to ensure a fair 
standard of living for the agricultural community"; "to stabilise 
markets"; "to assure the availability of supplies"; "to ensure 
that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices". Stabilisation 
of markets and security of supplies relate to the peculiar charac­
teristics of agricultural markets and of food as the most basic 
economic necessity; and prices to the consumers also relate, up 
to a point, to the latter characteristic. But productivity and 
producers' liying standards are not more relevant to agriculture 
than to various other sectors; and the question has been asked 
why one group of producers should be specially favoured in this 
way. The answer lies, of course, in the bargain that was struck 
when the EEC was established; and the retention of the Rome Treaty's 
formulation may be seen as a political condition of acceptance of 




























































































Special treatment is also given to the field of energy 
in the Treaties establishing the European Community. For coal 
(as for steel), the objectives can be grouped under headings 
similar to those for agriculture, with the addition of the develop­
ment of international trade (ECSC Treaty, article 3). For atomic 
energy, safety and security are also stressed (Euratom Treaty, 
article 2). But there is no mention in these Treaties of oil or 
gas, or of an overall energy policy.
As with agriculture, paragraph f on energy in article 53 
of the Draft Treaty is confined to the statement of objectives:
"in the field of energy, action by the Union shall be designed 
to ensure security of supplies, stability on the market of the 
Union and, to the extent that prices are regulated, a harmonised 
pricing policy compatible with fair competitive practices. It 
shall also be designed to encourage the development of alternative 
and renewable energy sources, to introduce common technical stan­
dards for efficiency, safety, the protection of the environment 
and of the population, and to encourage the exploitation of 
European sources of energy".
Security of supplies and stability on the market are 
of peculiar importance with respect to energy as to agriculture; 
and standards for safety and for the protection of the environment 
and of the population also have particular significance in the 
field of energy. The Draft Treaty is right to give the European 
Union these responsibilities which the Member States are decreas- 
ingly able to carry, or where, as in the case of safety and 
environmental standards, actions in one Member State can have 
significant effects beyond national frontiers. The objective of 
a harmonised pricing policy to the extent that prices are regulated 
is also hard to gainsay, although it seems likely that this is 
already covered by article 101 of the Rome Treaty which requires 
the remoyal of any "difference between the provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States (which) 
is distorting the conditions of competition in the common market". 





























































































of energy as well as other European sources are worthy aims; 
encouraging conservation would also be a worthy aim - but this 
raises the question whether it is advisable to list objectives 
in so much detail, or whether these more detailed objectives are 
not implicit in the wider objectives of security and stability.
There should be some reluctance to enshrine in a Treaty that 
has many of the characteristics of a constitution specific 
policies that may in the future cease to be such significant 
priorities. But apart from this, and the perhaps unnecessary 
addition of "common technical standards for efficiency" among 
the things that Union action is to introduce, paragraph f appears 
to include only objectives with respect to which a strong case 
can be made for common action by the Union, and not to include 
matters that would be better left as the exclusive province of 
the States. Whether, in order to preserve their proper province 
for the States, the Union competence should be explicitly confined 
to action in pursuit of the specified objectives is a matter for 
jurists rather than economists to judge.
Social policy
The Institutional Affairs Committee's rapporteur on 
"policy for society" was concerned to gain popular support for 
the European Union project. "We cannot", he wrote, "expect 
Community citizens to enthuse about a purely institutional project 
or support it without knowing what policies, and the substance 
thereof, will be implemented by institutions of the future Union". 
But he went on to "admit that a positive description of the 
policies aspired to cannot include many practical details if it 
is seen as part of a venture designed to result in the drafting 
of a text that could serve as a constitution".^5  ̂ We have already 
encountered, in our examination of the part of the Draft Treaty 
concerning economic policy, some articles that appeared to contain 
unsuitable details. But the part of the Draft on "policy for 
society" raises doubts of another order: regarding the suitability 
of allowing the Union to coerce the States at all where social 
policies are concerned.
(45)q . pfennig^ "The European Union's powers in the area of
policy for society", in Report of the Committee on Institutional 




























































































Article 55 of the Draft Treaty gives the Union 
"concurrent competence in the field of social, health, consumer 
protection, regional, environmental, education and research, 
cultural and information policies". Thus the Union appears to 
have potentially exclusive competence (see p.3 above) for social 
policy as a whole or, if the word social is to be more narrowly 
interpreted than in customary English usage, at least over a very 
large part of social policy.
It is a normal principle of federal constitutions that 
functions are not transferred from the States to the federal 
government unless the States are unable to perform them satisfac­
torily; and the drafters of the European Union Treaty clearly 
intended the principle of subsidiarity to have the same result 
(see p.5 above). Proposals for federal systems usually envisage 
leaving the great bulk of social policy with the S t a t e s . Y e t  
the constitutional defence of States' autonomy in these matters 
under the Draft Treaty seems to rest heavily on the principle of 
subsidiarity, which may as we have seen be an inadequate safeguard.
One way to limit the scope for the Union's incursion 
into Member States' autonomy in these fields would be to confine 
the Union's "concurrent competence in the field of social, health, 
consumer protection, regional, environmental, education and 
research, cultural and information policies" (art. 55) explicitly 
to only such parts of those fields as are specified in the subse­
quent arti cl es 56-62. Yet even this would leave some provisions 
with highly centralising potential. Thus "the regional policy of 
the Union shall comprise the development of a European framework 
for the regional planning policies possessed by the competent 
authorities in each Member State" (art. 58). If a framework is 
to be effective, it is necessary to ensure that the policies made 
within the framework do indeed conform to it: hence the possibility 
that the Union could veto a local authority's decision to build a 
road by-passing a town or, conversely, could force the building 
of a road in the teeth of local opposition. Article 58 opens the
^ ^ S e e  for example Francesco Rossolillo, c i t t a  t e r r i t o r i o  





























































































door, then, to detailed interference by the Union in what can 
be very local affairs. "The Union-wide validity and equivalence 
of diplomas and school, study and training periods" (art. 60) 
may give the Union scope to impose excessive uniformity of cur­
ricula in schools and higher education. "The establishment of 
general comparable conditions for the maintenance and creation 
of jobs" (art. 56) might be interpreted extremely widely; and 
"trade union rights and collective negotiations between employers 
and employees, in particular with a view to the conclusion of 
Union-wide collective agreement" has already been mentioned as 
an area where there could be high risks in Union intervention 
.without local consent.
A second possibility would be for the Union to be 
allowed to spend its money in the fields or on the aims specified 
in articles 56-62, or even in the very wide fields listed in 
article 55, but not to interfere in legislation or expenditure 
by Member States, except where the Rome Treaty already provides 
for this (eg with respect to equal pay and to the size of 
subsidies to investments in the various regions). Harmonisation 
of Member States' legislation could also be subject to the method 
of cooperation, based on unanimous agreement among the Member 
States. If the European Parliament is not convinced by these
arguments, and Union control over States' legislation is thought 
to be particularly important in some parts of the areas listed 
in articles 55-62, the list of subjects specified in these 
articles should at least be carefully scrutinised in order to 
determine where the case is particularly strong, so that subordin­
ation of State to Union legislation would be confined to as short 
a list of subjects as possible.
I
Conclusi ons
A number of ways in which the Draft Treaty might be 
amended have been considered, some of which may be regarded as 
important or even essential improvements, others as minor amelior­
ations that might help to make the draft stronger or more acceptable.
^ ^ A r t i c l e  55 could then read "The Union shall conduct its relations 
by the method of cooperation in the field of social, health, 
consumer protection, regional, environmental, education and 





























































































Perhaps the most significant single issue is whether 
the principle of subsidiarity can be made a more effective safe­
guard against the danger of over-centralisation. One possibility 
is to define the principle more sharply, particularly in order to 
forestall any tendency to circumvent it by adopting inherently 
centralising objectives. Another would be to give more weight 
to the values of diversity and decentralisation in the general 
objectives of the Union. A third would be to ensure that the 
Union's guarantees of human rights are defined as effectively 
as possible to this end.
A different form of general safeguard would be the 
requirement of an absolute or a qualified majority of the votes 
of Member States' representations in the Council, instead of 
just one-third of the weighted votes plus one, if the Union is 
to enact laws that "extend" its common action. (On the other 
hand it would seem desirable that appointment of the Commission's 
President and amendment of the Treaty could be decided by something 
short of unanimous agreement.)
None of these general safeguards seems, however, strong 
enough to obviate the need to define limits to the Union's action 
in fields specified in the Draft Treaty, in order to prevent the 
exercise of the Union's concurrent competence from automatically 
giving the Union exclusive competence over an excessively wide 
area. These limits may be defined in terms of the aims, fields 
or instruments of Union policy, or conditions that must apply if 
Union action is to be justified.
One of the ways in which Union activity can be limited 
in certain fields is by confining it to cases which "directly 
affect the establishment or functioning of the common market"
(as the Rome Treaty puts it, in article 100 on the approximation 
of laws) or which involve "distortions in economic transactions 
among the Member States", or some such formulation. Such limits 
have been suggested above with respect to competition policy, 




























































































transport and telecommunications; and it has been suggested that 
the cases be further limited to those with a substantial effect.
Other aims can in addition be allocated to the Union, 
such as stability of markets and security of supplies (agriculture, 
energy). As far as agriculture is concerned, this aim is not 
defined in order to limit Union activity to action taken to further 
it, but in order to guide Union action within the wide field of 
agricultural policy which is open to it. There is a case, however, 
for limiting any use of special Union powers allocated by the Draft 
Treaty in the field of energy to these and a few other specified 
ends such as safety and environmental protection, beyond which 
any action in this field would have to rest on the powers given 
to the Union elsewhere in the Draft Treaty, as well as in the 
Community Treaties. Other examples of specific aims laid down 
for the Union are the creation of a "telecommunications network" 
and of a "transport network commensurate with European needs"; 
and the Union's powers specific to these two fields could well 
be limited to that, together with the removal of distortions that 
substantially affect economic transactions among the States.
A narrower definition of fields for Union action than 
the Draft Treaty proposes has been suggested for competition 
policy (to concern the matters defined in the EEC and the ECSC 
Treaties), and for tax harmonisation (to exclude personal income 
tax). A narrower definition has likewise been suggested for the 
field that contains the heart of the Draft Treaty's economic 
proposals: conjunctura1 (as the Draft Treaty puts it) or general 
economic policy. Here it is proposed that, while the Union should 
use any of its own financial and budgetary instruments in pursuing 
its general economic policy, its interventions regarding the 
Member States' laws, policies and instruments in this field should 
be confined to monetary affairs, leaving the States' and local 





























































































This leads on to the issue of those provisions in the 
Draft Treaty that give the Union concurrent competence to coord­
inate the policies or actions of the Member States. Where, as 
with monetary policy, exclusive competence for the Union is a 
legitimate eventual aim, such a provision is justified. Where, 
as with research and development, such a degree of centralisation 
appears highly undesirable, it has been suggested that the Union's 
activity be based on expenditure from its own resources (which 
under the terms of the Draft Treaty can be very substantial), 
whether alone or jointly with Member States, but that no provision 
be made for the Union to exercise compulsion over the research 
policies or programmes of the States or over private research 
and development. Industrial policy comes somewhere between the 
two, but this paper, in accordance with the decentralist (or 
federalist) philosophy that underlies it, leans towards a formul­
ation in the Draft Treaty similar to that suggested for research 
and development, bearing in mind that the Community patrimony 
already gives the Union important instruments of industrial policy 
in the form of the competition policy, the control over state 
aids, the common commercial policy, and the financial and budgetary 
resources which under the Draft Treaty can be increased so as to 
carry much greater weight.
Also in line with the paper's decentralist and federalist 
philosophy, it is suggested that the Union's power to control the 
States' laws, policies or expenditure on social policy should be 
very restricted, if indeed the Union is to have any such power 
beyond the few items that it inherits from the Community. The 
Union's power to spend its own money in these fields using the 
method of common action is viewed more tolerantly. Apart from 
this, however, the method of cooperation appears more suitable 
than that of common action over most if not all of this field, 
because the relationship between Union and States should not be 
based on compulsion.
The major instance with respect to which it has been 
suggested that Union competence could be limited by a condition 




























































































conditional on Member States' agreement that adequate equilibrium 
had been established in their mutual economic relationships.
Apart from those matters that reflect the great issue 
of subordinate or coordinate relationships between the Union and 
the States, there are some articles that contain what appears to 
be unnecessary detail, whose removal would strengthen the Draft 
Treaty. Examples are to be found in the articles on telecommuni­
cations and the free movement of goods and services.
★ ★ ★
None of these detailed criticisms of the Draft Treaty's 
provisions for economic and social policy should be taken as 
calling in question the essential principles that are embodied 
in the Draft. The intention is quite the opposite. The Draft 
has attracted the support of the Belgian and Italian Parliaments 
and President Mitterrand has said kind words about it in his 
address to the European Parliament on 24 May 1 9 8 4 ; ^ ^  and it has 
been on the agenda of the Ad Hoc Committee on Institutions 
established following Mitterrand's initiative at the Fontainebleau 
summit. But that is a far cry from ratification of the Draft 
Treaty as it stands. A great deal of effort will have to be put 
into persuading p a r i i a m e n t s t h e  public and of course governments 
if a European Union Treaty containing the Draft Treaty's essential 
features is to be ratified; and careful consideration of proposed 
amendments to the Draft should both help to improve the Treaty 
and contribute to the process of persuasion: a sort of engrenage 
between the European Parliament and political forces in the member 
countries. Such a process is not only necessary if enough govern­
ments and parliaments are to be convinced that the Treaty should 
be ratified. It would also help to establish what Wessels has 
rightly stressed is an essential basis of the European Union: 
its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens.





























































































One particular merit of giving a prominent place in 
such discussion to the main concern of this paper - safeguards 
for the proper autonomy of the Member States - could be to 
channel nationalist reactions in a constructive direction. Even 
if one does not go all the way with Friedrich's categorisation 
of the type of constitution to which we are accustomed in the 
West as "a system of effective, regularised restraints upon the 
exercise of governmental p o w e r " , t h i s  is certainly an important 
requirement for the European Union Treaty. The Union should be 
based on a coordinate relationship between Union and States, not 
on the subordination of one to the other; and the preservation of 
sufficient autonomy for the States is an essential part of this.
But it is, equally, important that the Union not be subordinate 
to the States in matters where Union action is necessary for the 
general welfare. Thus the European Parliament should not fail 
to defend the hard core of its Draft: co-decision by Council and 
Parliament with no time limits and majority votes; basic economic 
powers in the fields of the internal market, monetary union and 
the Union's financial resources.
 ̂ ^Carl J. Friedrich, "Federal Constitutional Theory and Emergent 
Proposals", in Arthur W. Macmahon (ed.), op. c i t . , p .516 ; 
Friedrich refers here to his C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Government and 
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